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The paper is about the art of exchange rate management by central banks. It begins by reviewing the diversity of objectives and practices of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. Central banks typically exercise discretion in determining when and to what extent to intervene. Some central banks use publicly declared rules of intervention, with the aim of increasing visibility and strengthening the signaling channel of policy. There is tentative evidence that the volatility of foreign exchange reserves is comparatively lower in emerging market economies where central banks follow some form of rules-based foreign exchange intervention. The paper goes on to argue that when the This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Development Economics Vice Presidency. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at avaroudakis@worldbank.org.
foreign exchange market includes some large strategic participants, the central bank can achieve superior outcomes if intervention takes the form of a rule, or "schedule," indicating commitments to buying and selling different quantities of foreign currency conditional on the exchange rate. Exchange rate management and reserve management can then be treated as two independent objectives by the central bank. In line with the stylized facts reviewed, this would enable a central bank to pursue exchange rate objectives with minimum reserve changes, or achieve reserve targets with minimum impact on the exchange rate.
Introduction
Central banks intervene in foreign exchange (FX) markets when they target particular levels of the exchange rate, through pegs, crawls, or bands with respect to other currencies or currency baskets. Even when they do not target a particular rate, they may intervene when there is excessive volatility in the exchange rate, which can be destabilizing for traders and ordinary consumers. When faced with current account surpluses or capital inflows, central banks that target the exchange rate end up accumulating large amounts of FX reserves. Accumulation of reserves can also be a symptom of an undervalued exchange rate that some governments have used to promote exports-or to prevent an appreciation that could undermine competitiveness.
The extraordinary accumulation of reserves by the People's Bank of China since the mid-1990s and by the Swiss National Bank in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global financial crisisespecially following the Swiss franc's peg to the euro in September 2011-have been the focus of a lot of discussion and analysis.
1 By contrast, central banks that intervene to prevent exchange rate depreciation could see their FX reserves get depleted.
Central banks committed to a floating exchange rate intervene in foreign exchange markets for various reasons: When, for instance, a country's currency appreciates because of some shock and the central bank believes that this is a temporary fluctuation, it may want to prevent the appreciation of the exchange rate that may undermine growth. The central bank may also want to contain excessive currency depreciation, if it is believed to be short-lived, when domestic agents have unhedged foreign currency borrowing exposure that may imperil financial stability. When such temporary shocks occur frequently, central banks may systematically intervene to contain exchange rate volatility. Central banks also intervene to manage FX reserves at levels deemed adequate against volatile capital flows and debt servicing obligations.
The present paper is an amoral one. It takes no stance on the goodness of interventions in the foreign exchange market by central banks. Its concern is with the efficacy of such interventions, no matter what prompts them. It is arguable that our understanding of the mechanics of central 1 See, for example, Ross and Jones, (2013) , who point to evidence that, in the face of excessive accumulation of FX reserves in a near-zero interest rate environment for US dollar and euro denominated bonds, central banks have been increasingly searching for opportunities to diversify reserve holding into higher-yielding assets, including from emerging market economies. According to IMF statistics, worldwide FX reserve holdings had more than doubled, from US$ 5 trillion in 2006 to US$ 10.8 trillion in 2012.
3 bank intervention is quite rudimentary. Most of the time, the nature of intervention is prompted by rules of thumb instead of a proper understanding of the microeconomic foundations of such policy. We get the interventions approximately right more by virtue of evolution than understanding (Basu, 2013) . Over time, the blatantly wrong interventions have perished through a process of imitation and learning. In reality there is much to be gained by observing behavior and rigorously analyzing the microeconomic foundations of such interventions. Accordingly, this paper surveys the response of central banks and then presents a theoretical argument on how central banks can intervene more effectively.
Central banks typically exercise discretion in the timing and amount of their FX interventions.
But some central banks also use rules when they intervene, to increase visibility and strengthen the signaling channel of their policy. The focus of interest in this paper is the modality of intervention. If the central bank's interest is in depreciating the exchange rate, not in building up FX reserves, is a discretionary purchase of FX the best way to achieve this? One consequence of such action to depreciate the domestic currency is that it causes a build-up of FX reserves, such as happened recently with the Swiss National Bank. Some countries wish to minimize the opportunity cost of building up large volumes of low-yield FX reserves. Central banks often also want to minimize the quasi-fiscal cost of sterilization that may be necessary to mitigate the impact of intervention on money supply and inflation. Are there other ways of intervening in the foreign exchange market which can help depreciate the exchange rate without a reserve build-up and vice versa? The aim of this paper is to answer this question with a review of the actual experience of central banks and a theoretical analysis.
The next section briefly reviews the diversity of objectives and modalities of FX intervention in countries with managed float or free floating exchange rates. The third section reviews the modalities and extent of FX intervention in selected emerging market and advanced economies, with a view to illustrating cases where central banks follow some rule of FX intervention or practice discretion. It also reviews evidence on FX reserve volatility across countries. There is tentative evidence that the volatility of FX reserves is lower in emerging market economies where central banks follow some form of rules-based FX intervention.
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The fourth section draws on simple microeconomic theory presented in Basu (2012) and shows that by appropriately designing the modalities of intervention, the acts of influencing the exchange rate and managing the stock of FX reserves can be separated from each other. When the foreign exchange market includes some big strategic participants, the central bank can influence the exchange rate without necessarily accumulating or drawing FX reserves, if it follows a "schedule intervention," known to everyone, which conditions interventions on market values of the exchange rate. This is consistent with the stylized facts reviewed regarding the lower volatility of FX reserves when central banks follow some form of intervention rule. The last section discusses the policy implications of the analysis.
Objectives and Modalities of FX Intervention
In many emerging market economies, the objectives of FX intervention have evolved along with a gradual change in their exchange rate regimes and frameworks for monetary policy. An increasing number of emerging economies, especially after the East Asian financial crisis, moved away from pegged or tightly managed exchange rate regimes (exchange rate crawls or bands) to flexible exchange rates. At the same time, they adopted inflation targeting, with short-term interest rates used as the main policy instrument to achieve the inflation targets. Under this monetary policy framework, the inflation target serves as a nominal policy anchor while the flexible exchange rate serves as a shock absorber to the economy and an information variable to the monetary authorities, rather than a policy variable.
The objectives of FX intervention have changed over time: From stabilizing the exchange rateas in exchange rate pegs, crawls, or bands-to containing excessive exchange rate volatility and preventing movements that appear to be inconsistent with fundamentals (exchange rate misalignment). Despite the move toward inflation targeting and flexible exchange rates, there is evidence that inflation-targeting central banks in emerging market economies intervene actively in FX markets, although less so than those central banks which do not explicitly target the inflation rate (Ostry, Ghosh, and Chamon, 2012 iii. "Leaning against the wind": While central banks intervene with the aim of reversing exchange rate trends, they are also often concerned with slowing the pace of exchange rate fluctuations without reversing the underlying trend. Reduced market uncertainty is seen as a benefit of this practice. Intervention typically takes place in the spot FX market because this market is more liquid than forward FX markets, which helps the objective of influencing the spot exchange rate or managing the outstanding stock of FX reserves. Some central banks also practice interventions in forward markets-the markets for currency delivery in more than two business days. As the forward FX price is linked to the spot FX price through the "covered interest parity" condition,
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forward market intervention can influence the spot exchange rate as well. 2 But in contrast to spot market interventions, forward market interventions do not require immediate funding because payment takes place when the transaction is completed at a future date with the purchase or the sale of the foreign exchange. Forward market intervention can thus be conducted discretely, with little impact on FX reserves, as long as the factor that triggers the intervention is short-lived.
Influencing the spot exchange rate without affecting the level of FX reserves is also a feature of the strategic approach to intervention outlined in this paper (Section 4 However, some central banks also use forms of rules-based intervention:
2 Covered interest parity can be illustrated by considering the options open, for example, to an investor who can hold either a US$ or a euro-denominated asset for one year. Holding the US$-denominated asset yields a return of 1+R $ per US$ (where R $ is the interest rate on the US$ asset). Investing an equal amount of US$ into euro-denominated assets, at the spot exchange rate of S euros per US$, would yield a return of (1+R e )•S in euros per dollar invested. If the investor contracts to convert the proceeds back into US$ in one year at the prevailing euro-per-dollar forward exchange rate F at the beginning of the investment period, the expected return per dollar would be (1+R e )•(S/F). Covered interest parity (CIP) establishes no-arbitrage (equality) between the returns under the two strategies: 1+R $ = (1+R e )•(S/F). If CIP holds, FX intervention that changes the forward market exchange rate should also be reflected into a proportional change in the spot exchange rate. 3 According to a central bank survey reported in C.J. Neely (2000), 52.9 percent of 17 responding central banks were sometimes intervening in the forward FX market. This percentage was lower in the survey reported by BIS (see Archer, 2005 ii. Exchange-rate based rules specify the type of intervention to be triggered by some exchange rate development, usually with the aim of containing volatility. Such rules have been used by Colombia, Mexico, and Guatemala. These come to some extent close to the concept of "schedule intervention" outlined in the theory of strategic intervention below (Section 4).
Rules often aim to increase visibility of FX interventions so as to strengthen the signaling channel of policy and achieve FX reserve targets with minimum market noise. The signaling channel assumes that central banks possess superior information than market participants, which is revealed through FX intervention. This additional information changes the expectations of market participants-including about future monetary policies-and affects exchange rates through the forward-looking FX market (Sarno and Taylor, 2001) . If the signaling channel is sufficiently strong, central banks have an incentive to clearly communicate their intentions by following some form of FX intervention rule. By affecting perceptions of market participants, intervention rules may thus possibly change exchange rates with minimum transactions taking place. This possibility will be theoretically demonstrated below.
The Nature of FX Intervention in Selected Countries and Some Stylized Facts
This section reviews the modalities and extent of FX intervention in selected emerging market economies and high-income economies. Emerging market economies have been selected so as to illustrate cases where central banks follow some rule of FX intervention (Mexico, Colombia, Turkey) or practice discretionary intervention (India). Central banks of advanced economies that manage major reserve currencies (US Fed, ECB) generally do not intervene in the FX market.
The specific cases of Japan and Switzerland are discussed as they present notable exceptions to this practice. 
Mexico
Mexico has been operating a free floating exchange rate regime since the peso crisis in 1994. There is also a significant positive correlation between FX interventions and the nominal effective exchange rate of the peso. This suggests a focus on mitigating exchange rate volatility, as the central bank has tended to step up FX purchases when the exchange rate appreciated and, conversely, refrained from FX purchases, or sold foreign currency, when the exchange rate was under pressure to depreciate.
Turkey
Turkey 
India
India operates a floating exchange rate regime. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has no fixed or preannounced target or band for the exchange rate. The RBI intervenes in the interbank FX market in a discretionary manner, with the aim of modulating excessive volatility and maintaining orderly market conditions. As persistent unidirectional movements of the exchange rate tend to amplify expectations of one-way movements, FX intervention aims at times to moderate speculative expectations of such movements (Gokarn, 2012) . The RBI intervenes in both the spot and forward interbank FX markets depending on market conditions. It deals only with authorized dealers and publishes monthly intervention data.
The nominal effective exchange rate of the rupee followed a moderately depreciating trend over 8 An equivalent stylized fact could be that, for a given level of FX intervention, the impact on the exchange rate would be stronger when the central bank uses an exchange rate-based FX intervention rule than when it intervenes with discretion. A study by Adler and Tovar (2011) examined the impact of FX intervention through an empirical exchange rate model on a panel of 15 countries over six common episodes when flows into emerging markets were high or rising strongly. The regressions found evidence that FX intervention affects the pace (acceleration) of exchange rate appreciation but not the rate (speed) of appreciation. When the regression controls for discretionary vs. rules-based central bank intervention, the estimated impact of intervention on the pace of exchange rate appreciation is higher when intervention is rules-based than when it is discretionary, although the difference is not significant. 
Theory of Strategic Intervention by Central Banks
What we want to demonstrate in this section is what was suggested by the above discussion, namely, that a central bank can be much more effective in its interventions in the FX market if it adopts a different kind of intervention from the standard ones used. To demonstrate this let us begin by explaining the logic behind the standard "quantity intervention" typically used by central banks, when they want to influence the market exchange rate.
Suppose the demand and supply of a foreign currency (henceforth, dollars) is shown by the curves D 0 and S in Figure 4 .1. The vertical axis expresses the price of dollars in terms of the domestic currency (henceforth, rupees) and the horizontal axis shows the quantity of dollars.
Given these demand and supply curves, the price of dollars (in rupee The standard theory of oligopoly shows, and this is established in Basu (2012) , that if we pivot the demand curve suitably around the point E 1 , we can ensure that the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot players will occur at E 1 . 
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To get an intuitive idea of the proof, consider the case where there are only two Cournot firms and the cost of supply is zero. It is well-known and easy to check that in this case, if the demand curve is linear, then the Cournot equilibrium is at a point located at two-thirds of the length of this line starting from the top end. That being so, for any point on the demand curve D 0 in Figure   4 .3 the Cournot equilibrium can be directed there by having a demand curve which is a straight line and for which the point at two-thirds the line's length occurs there. In other words, the exchange rate will have been moved with the announcement of the intention to accumulate or drain specific amounts of reserves at various exchange rate levels.
Discussion and Policy Implications
As we have argued, standard quantity intervention in the FX market, even if effective in influencing the exchange rate and achieving the objectives pursued by central banks, leads to a building up or running down of FX reserves. This entails costs and risks: To the extent a reserve build-up is not fully sterilized, it may boost domestic liquidity and undermine inflation targets.
At the same time, full sterilization comes with quasi fiscal costs, in addition to the opportunity cost of holding low-yield FX reserves. Conversely, an excessive decline of reserves to prevent the currency from depreciating may lead market participants to question reserve adequacy and trigger speculative attacks. Thus, except when the purpose of FX intervention is to manage FX reserves, it is desirable to achieve the exchange rate objectives sought with minimum variation in FX reserves. Our paper demonstrates that this is possible.
As demonstrated above, when the foreign exchange market includes some big strategic participants, the central bank can achieve superior outcomes if intervention takes the form of a "schedule", indicating commitments to buying and selling different quantities of foreign currency conditional on the exchange rate. This would enable a central bank to pursue exchange rate objectives with minimum reserve changes, or achieve reserve targets with minimum impact on the exchange rate.
An implication of the theory of strategic intervention is that if some central banks were to use schedule intervention they would be expected, all else equal, to intervene less in the FX market compared to central banks that intervene with discretion. Even though no central bank currently intervenes according to the modalities explored in this paper, rules-based intervention used by some central banks comes close to the concept of "schedule intervention". The theory of strategic intervention accounts for the stylized fact that FX reserves are less volatile in countries where central banks follow some form of rules-based intervention.
A question that arises when considering practical implementation is whether schedule intervention could work symmetrically, when a central bank signals its readiness to buy foreign exchange to prevent exchange rate appreciation and when it signals a commitment to selling foreign exchange to avert depreciation. While the central bank's capacity to purchase foreign exchange is virtually unlimited, its ability to prevent undue exchange rate depreciation by selling foreign exchange could be limited by its stock of foreign exchange reserves-possibly augmented by currency swaps that provide extra foreign exchange liquidity, arranged with other central banks. The credibility of schedule intervention aimed to prevent excessive exchange rate depreciation could thus be limited by the stock of foreign exchange reserves. However, the very large cushions of foreign exchange reserves accumulated by many countries in recent years could mitigate such credibility concerns. This being said, the credibility of a fundamentally misaligned exchange rate would come necessarily into question, because the misalignment would affect the performance of the economy as a whole, so that schedule intervention-as, in fact, any kind of standard quantity intervention-could only postpone the inevitable day of reckoning.
Converting the theory of schedule intervention outlined in this paper into practice will require time and significant empirical work. A key step toward operationalization would be a reliable estimation of the net FX demand, based on the FX market microstructure, which would allow calibrating the schedule intervention function. Proceeding by trial and error would be unavoidable as it is unrealistic to expect a precise enough estimation of the intervention needed at each exchange rate level to achieve a specific FX market outcome. However, undertaking some risk may pay off by helping discover superior policy instruments.
